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TO DUST SHALL YE RETURN?
Henry S. Ruth, Jr.*
I. Introduction
"In this world, nothing can be said to be certain except death and taxes"'
-and presidential commissions. Proponents of any commission argue that an
executive should launch a broad action program only on the basis of a prior
independent study of all relevant factors.
In April of 1931, Calvin Coolidge said:
The use of fact-finding commissions is again being criticized. About twenty-
five years ago agitation caused the Congress to prohibit spending public
money for such purpose....
Some people are born with a complete set of ready-made opinions. Facts
do not affect them. But no executive, from first selectman to President,
can know everything necessary to discharge his office or be able to learn it
from official sources. He must call on some body which can gather the
information. Public duty requires it.'
Critics of these bodies note acidly that a commission is a cynical creature
of politics, a method of buying time, or a device for calming the public in mat-
ters where agitation and aggressive concern are truly appropriate.' In the past
few years numerous presidential commissions4 have filed their reports on subjects
ranging from the assassination of a president5 to heart disease, cancer, and stroke0
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School; former Deputy
Director, President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice.
1 C. VAN DOREN, BENJAmIN FRANKLIN 773 (1938).
2 N.Y. Herald Tribune, April 16, 1931, at 1, col. 2-3.
3 In 1929, one writer noted:
Washington has grown exceedingly cynical on the subject of special governmental
commissions. Many such bodies have come into existence and passed away in
recent years, leaving behind them voluminous unread reports and recommenda-
tions. . . . The establishment of a special commission to investigate or consider
some great question of the hour is a tried and reliable device which makes it possible
for an administration to offer the appearance of great activity without making
any definite decision. . . . (N)ine times out of ten, when these conclusions and
recommendations have been announced with all proper solemnity, that is the end
of the subject .... Murphy, The Sphinx Commission, 10 COMMONwEAL 249 (1929).
In MacKenzie, The Compromise Report on Crime, NEw REPUBLIC, Feb. 4, 1967, at
15, the author wrote that the membership of the President's Commission on Law Enforce-
ment and Administration of Justice was "chosen cross-sectionally the way the Warren Com-
mission was chosen and partly for the same purpose: to calm the country down." The author
concluded that President Johnson had "bought time with the commission study, and soon
he must move, ready or not." Id. at 16.
4 Use of the term "presidential commission" is circumscribed to include only ad hoc
commissions appointed for a specific term by an Executive Order. Of course, the President
is connected with many other kinds of study groups. In January of 1968, there existed 193
committees, commissions, task forces, study groups, advisory councils, and interagency com-
mittees with some degree of presidential involvement. Letter from Joseph Laitin, Assistant
to the Director, Bureau of the Budget, to Henry S. Ruth, Jr., Jan. 12, 1968.
For a discussion of the goals, problems, and functions of commissions and other study
groups, see Bell, Government by Commission, THE PUBLIC INThREsT, Spring, 1966, at 3-9.
For a description of the roles served by advisory committees in local government, see Schaller,
Is the Citizen Advisory Committee a Threat to Representative Government?, 24 PuB. ADMiN.
REv. 175 (1964). For an analysis of presidential commissions from 1900 to 1940, see C.
MARCY, PRESMENTrAL CoMMIssIoNs (1945). For Marcy's analysis of the future role
of the commission device, see id. at 102-06.
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In fact, it is fair to say that no major national problem has been immune from
study by a temporary commission. It is hardly surprising, then, that in the midst
of a bitter national debate on crime and criminal justice, President Johnson
appointed his Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice.
The purpose of this Article is to discuss briefly the background of this national
crime commission, its method of operation, and the plans for implementation
of its recommendations.
During its work from July of 1965 to June of 1967, the Commission had
a full-time staff of approximately forty professionals and utilized the services
of about four hundred fifty consultants and advisers.7 Its publications include
nine task force reports concerned with specific aspects of crime and criminal
justice,' five field survey reports,9 forty-one consultant papers,"0 and a general
report, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, which summarizes all the
Commission's conclusions and recommendations.
II. Background of the Commission
For various reasons, public concern about crime ascended rapidly during
the first half of the 1960's. National crime rates during 1960-65 reflected an
upward trend that was increasing faster than the previous long-term trend."
The number of serious offenses known to the police per 100,000 population
for these five years rose twenty-five percent for violent crimes and thirty-six
percent for property crimes.m ' The largest increases occurred in 1964, with
5 THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F.
KENNEDY, REPORT (1964).
6 THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON HEART DISEASE, CANCER AND STROKE, A NA-
TIONAL PROGRAM TO CONQUER HEART DISEASE, CANCER AND STROKE: REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT (1965).
7 A listing of the consultants and advisers is found in THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A
FREE SOCIETY, A REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, 313-25 (1967). [hereinafter cited as CRIME REPORT.] A listing
of professional staff members is found at an unnumbered page following the foreword to
the Crime Report.
8 The nine task force reports are entitled: THE POLICE, THE COURTS, CORRECTIONS,
ORGANIZED CRIME, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, DRUNKENNESS, NARCOTICS AND DRUG
ABUSE, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME, and CRIME AND ITS IMPACT - AN
ASSESSMENT. All were published in 1967. [hereinafter the task force reports will be cited as,
for example, TFR ON THE POLICE.]
9 The five field survey reports are authored and titled as follows: BUREAU OF SOCIAL
SCIENCE RESEARCH, FIELD SURVEY I: REPORT ON A PILOT STUDY IN THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA ON VICTIMIZATION AND ATTITUDES TowARD LAw ENFORCEMENT; NATIONAL
OPINION RESEARCH CENTER, FIELD SURVEY II: CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED
STATES: A REPORT OF A NATIONAL SURVEY; UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN SURVEY RESEARCH
CENTER, FIELD SURVEY III: STUDIES IN CRIME AND LAw ENFORCEMENT IN THE MAJOR
METROPOLITAN AREAS (volumes I and II); UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT BERKELEY,
SCHOOL OF CRIMINOLOGY, FIELD SURVEY IV: THE POLICE AND THE COMMUNITY (volumes
I and II); NATIONAL CENTER ON POLICE AND COMMUNITY RELATIONS, SCHOOL OF POLICE
ADMINISTRATION AND PUBLIC SAFETY, MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY, FIELD SURVEY V: A
NATIONAL SURVEY OF POLICE AND COMMUNITY RELATIONS. All the field surveys are dated
1967.
10 The forty-one consultant papers were published individually in June of 1967. Several
other consultant papers were published as appendices in the task force reports.
11 CRIME REPORT 24.
12 Id.
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forcible rape the leader among the violent crimes and motor vehicle theft the
leader among property crimes."
Other developments converged that year to heighten public interest and
alarm. A wave of riots commenced in the summer of 1964 as disturbances
erupted in New York City, Philadelphia, Chicago, Rochester, Paterson, Eliza-
beth, and Jersey City.' The Republican presidential candidate, Barry Gold-
water, was decrying lawlessness and crime in the streets during the summer and
fall of 1964."5 A Gallup poll in 1963 revealed that many persons considered
juvenile delinquency the second most important problem in their respective
communities.:" A 1964 Harris survey showed that the factor most often cited
by persons as causing increased crime in their neighborhoods was the existence
of "'disturbed and restless teenagers.' "'7 Finally, those blaming restrictive
court decisions for the rising crime rates acquired new fuel in June of 1964 with
the Supreme Court's decision in Escobedo v. Illinois.' The mounting alarm
mirrored a twofold concern: a belief by many that our system of criminal justice
and law enforcement was not adequately performing its role and a public fear
that criminality was a rapidly spreading force threatening basic public order
and security.
The overwhelming involvement of the federal government in social better-
ment programs - a development that had created revolutionary changes in
federal-state-city relationships during the past thirty or so years - had largely
bypassed the problems of law enforcement and criminal justice. For Americans
traditionally have desired hometown policing and hometown judicial systems
with neither the appearance nor the reality of administrative control or influence
from the higher levels of government. One need only mention the words
"national police force" to reinforce this local law enforcement orientation.
But in the Fall of 1964 it became apparent in the United States Depart-
ment of Justice that a suitable time for national action had arrived. All the
factors cited above influenced the decision for action. To cite this decision as
a political response to Barry Goldwater, as some may do, is to fall prey to a
much over-simplified view of federal government operations. Such a view also
does great injustice to the sincere, active, and abiding interest of the then Acting-
Attorney General, Nicholas Katzenbach, in creating an intelligent, informed
public appraisal of the crime problem and in rescuing law enforcement and
criminal justice from creaking concepts, machinery, procedures, and organiza-
tion. Political considerations may properly be cited as a catalyst, but not as a
founding father.
There were significant forerunners to a concentrated federal program in
this area. The President's Committee on Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime
13 Id.
14 TFR ON CRIME AND ITS IMPAT-AN ASSESSMENT 118.
15 Candidate Goldwater, however, apparently did desire to suppress the racism and further
public incendiarism that would have been engendered by emphasizing the riots; he refused
to authorize the showing of a film documentary, prepared by his staff, that depicted looting
and rioting by Negroes. T. WHITE, THE MAXING OF THE PRESIDENT - 1964, at 236, 332 n.9
(1965).
16 CRIME REPORT 49-50.
17 Id. at 49.
18 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
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had been operating since 1961 and, through the Office of Juvenile Delinquency
and Youth Development in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare,
was funding comprehensive, crime prevention-related programs in several major
cities.19 The President's Advisory Commission on Narcotic and Drug Abuse
completed its report in 1963.0 With impetus from the report of the Attorney
General's Committee on Poverty and the Administration of Federal Criminal
Justice,2 the Department of Justice and the Vera Foundation in 1964 spon-
sored a national conference on bail practices2 and appointed an executive board
to assist in the development of bail programs in various states.23 In August of
1964, Attorney General Robert Kennedy created a small Office of Criminal
Justice in the Department of Justice. 4 One of the major functions of this office
was to propose and aid in the implementation of reform measures in state and
local criminal justice operations.
Thus, the stage was set when, in his January 1965 State of the Union
message, President Johnson announced a forthcoming federal program touch-
ing upon all the problems of crime.2" Details of this program were revealed in
his first message to Congress on crime in March of 1965.'6 Included in the pro-
gram were: proposed federal aid to state, local, and private criminal justice
organizations; creation of a presidential commission on crime in the District
of Columbia; and establishment of the President's Commission on Law Enforce-
ment and Administration of Justice (National Crime Commission)."
The presidential mandate to the National Crime Commission apparently
ran to all problems, and all institutions related to crime in any way. The message
to Congress, the Executive Order creating the Commission in July of 1965,28
and the President's remarks to the members at their first meeting in September
19 U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, ANNUAL REP. 63-64 (1966). Both
the Committee and the Office have since been abolished.
20 THE PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY COMMISSION ON NARCOTIC AND DRUG ABUSE, FINAL
REPORT (1963).
21 THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON POVERTY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF
FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE, REPORT (1963).
22 NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON BAIL AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PROCEEDINGS AND INTERIM
REPORT (1965).
23 Id. at xiv-xxxii. The Vera Foundation is now the Vera Institute of Justice.
24 The early planning for the National Crime Commission was undertaken by the Office
of Criminal Justice. Four of the six members of the Office joined the Commission staff,
including the executive director and deputy director of that staff.
25 I PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENT-LYNDON B. JOHNSON 1965, at 1 (1966). In
the message, President Johnson stated: "I will soon assemble a panel of outstanding experts
to search out answers to the national problem of crime and delinquency." Id. at 7.
26 LYNDON B. JOHNSON, COMMENTS ON CRIME: ITS PREVALENCE AND MEASURES OF
PREVENTION, H.R. Doc. No. 103, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
27 The proposed federal aid program was passed by the Congress in September of 1965
and became the Law Enforcement Assistance Act of 1965, 18 U.S.C. Oh. 201 (Supp. 1966).
The Program has been administered by the Office of Law Enforcement Assistance in the
Department of Justice. See DEPT. OF JUSTICE, 2D ANN. REP. TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE
CONGRESS ON ACTIVITIES UNDER THE LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1965 (1967).
The President's Commission on Crime in the District of Columbia was created in July
1965 to study all aspects of crime and criminal justice in the District. See Exec. Order No.
11234, 3 C.F.R. 326 (Comp. 1964-65). The Commission's report was forwarded to the Presi-
dent in December of 1966. It was entitled THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON CRIME IN THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, REPORT AND APPENDIX (1966).
28 Exec. Order No. 11236, 3 C.F.R. 329 (Comp. 1964-65).
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of 196529 blanketed the spectrum from the causes of crime to crime prevention,
criminal justice agencies, and rehabilitation of released offenders in the com-
munity. Factual findings, conclusions, and recommendations were to be de-
livered to the President during the course of the Commission's work, with a
final report due not later than the end of January of 1967. It seems clear that
the President's 1965 crime program represented a compromise. A proposal
limited to the creation of study groups would certainly have been greeted with
a massive public yawn, if not outright indignation. As one periodical stated:
"Commissions come cheap in Washington, and most often their reports turn out
to be vague and anticlimactic."3 0 And yet, the federal government and the
public were probably not prepared for a massive, revolutionary program directed
towards informed, truly responsible, and properly framed reform. Thus, the
law enforcement assistance program was launched with a relatively small appro-
priations request. In a very meaningful sense, time was being bought, but
more importantly a carefully formulated set of conclusions and recommenda-
tions, and opportunities for public education, were being created.
III. Prior National Crime Study
Any commission with a broad mandate and a short time limit does well
at least to consider the adage that there is nothing new under the sun. Some-
where, at some time, persons have probably promulgated ideas, facts, theories,
and proposals that collectively will form a major part of any commission's
report. Existing enlightenment can be collected in a convincing package. A search
for dramatic new concepts and proposals, for instant solutions, or for universal an-
swers could, if a dominating factor, negate the utility and validity of any report.
True creativity will necessarily be offered by a commission in only a few areas; its
boldness and integrity is reflected primarily in its willingness to accept the exist-
ing ideas of progressive scholars and administrators who have been unable to
influence or affect the existing system to any great degree.
In the discovery and sorting process, the past is not to be discounted.
For example, in the 1880's, a Philadelphia police chief analyzed the crime problem
in the following manner:
What makes criminals, and how to deal with them, are two of the
most intricate problems of social science. Their own good should be con-
sidered as well as that of society . . . .My own views are founded less
upon theory, I think, than upon observation. I have noticed that when
a man is convicted of crime, especially of any crime against the rights of
property, he usually commits another offence within a short period of his
release from prison. He serves his term, is released, and goes back into the
world .... Does he reform and lead an honest life? On the contrary, he
returns to his old associates, if he had any; if not, he finds some, and it
is not long till he re-enters the prison for the second time a convict. There-
29 Remarks to the Members of the National Crime Comm'n, II PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE
PRESMENT - LYNDON B. JOHNSON 1965, at 982 '(1966). See also, Statement by the President
on Establishment of the National Crime Comm'n. Id. at 785. Excerpt of Letter to Members
of National Crime Comm'n. Id. at 879. Remarks on Announcing Appointment of James Voren-
berg. Id. at 901.
30 The Reporter, Sept. 23, 1965, at 18.
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fore I am brought to the conclusion that while existing prison systems are
useful to society by keeping dangerous men where they can do no mischief,
they are of little use to the criminal. I see that they restrain him; I cannot
see that they reform him. Records kept in this office show as many as eight
convictions of the same criminal ....
But philanthropy may long rack its brain in search for a cure for
crime; it would find much more satisfactory results from studying the pre-
vention of its many causes; such as defective training, evil companions,
mental incapacity, bad temper, strong drink, grinding poverty, and, for
persistency in crime, difficulty in retrieving lost character, which a some-
what extended observation has led me to name as some of the chief causes
of crime. I might add to them two others, which I have found prolific in
bad fruit: difficulty in obtaining employment, and carelessness: carelessness
on the part of owners of property, who leave temptation in the way of
the needy, from the housekeeper who leaves the day's wash unguarded on
the lines and the back gate open, to the board of bank directors who trust
blindly their own property and that of others to the falsified books of
some. cashier, as needy in his way as the tramp that robbed the clothes
line in his. To these causes I might add another: the opportunity to dis-
pose of stolen goods, readily and without fear of detection or betrayal.3 '
Here is an early perception of today's "new" trends: recognition of the failure
of institutional confinement as a rehabilitative device; emphasis upon the problem
of recidivism; recognition of poverty, ineffective family training, and lack of
job opportunities as basic conditions of crime; recognition of the necessity to
resurrect or create individual self-respect; a proposal to concentrate upon crime
prevention programs; recognition of the problem of white collar crime; awareness
of the importance of a study of victims' contributions to crime (so-called
victimology); and recognition of the need to explore the structured system for
disposal of stolen goods.
In the search for answers to crime problems, the concept of a national study
commission had precedent in President Hoover's National Commission on Law
Observance and Enforcement (popularly known as the Wickersham Commis-
sion). Despite unique factors surrounding the chaos of prohibition and its en-
forcement, there are remarkable similarities between the commissions of 1929
and 1965. Although the public in the prohibition era did not seem to be con-
cerned about the broad problems of crime nearly as much as the President him-
self was, his short assessment of that period rings a still-familiar tune. In April
of 1929, President Hoover stated:
What we are facing today is . .. the possibility that respect for law as
law is fading from the sensibilities of our people....
Every student of our law-enforcement mechanism knows full well that it
is in need of vigorous reorganization; that its procedure unduly favors the
criminal; ... that justice must be more swift and sure. In our desire to
be merciful the pendulum has swung in favor of the prisoner and far
away from the protection of society. The sympathetic mind of the Ameri-
can people in its over-concern about those who are in difficulties has swung
31 SPROGLE, THE PHILADELPHIA POLIcE, 270-71 '(1887).
[Symposium, 1968]
TO DUST SHALL YE RETURN?
too far from the family of the murdered to the family of the murderer.32
During the presidential campaign of 1928 Mr. Hoover promised that, if elected,
he would appoint a law enforcement commission." Its broad mandate was
to carry beyond the problems of prohibition, although this fact was not readily
apparent in either the Congressional authorizations' or the President's Inaugural
Address in March of 1929."5
The eleven-member Commission, with the exception of the president of
Radcliffe College, was composed of lawyers and judges." Drawn from ten
states, its membership included Dean Roscoe Pound of the Harvard Law School;
Newton Baker, a former Secretary of War; and a former Attorney General of
the United States, chairman George W. Wickersham." Public comment upon
appointment of the Commission in May of 1929 reflected the seeming ambiva-
lence of its mandate. Political motives were attributed to the President, and the
ensuing emphasis by the Administration upon a broad crime study was ascribed
by some to a desire to submerge the prohibition question."
The President's address to the first meeting of the Commission in May
of 1929 did not even mention prohibition. 9 Chairman Wickersham later ob-
served that the most explicit definition of the Commission's undertaking appeared
in the President's annual message to Congress in December of that year. 0 In
that message the President declared:
Under the authority of Congress I have appointed a National Committee
on Law Observance and Enforcement for an exhaustive study of the entire
problem of the enforcement of our laws and the improvement of our
judicial system, including the special problems and abuses growing out of
32 Address by President Hoover, Associated Press Annual Meeting, April 22, 1929, in
MYERS AND NEWTON, THE HOOVER ADMINISTRATION 384 (1936). When asked on a tele-
vision show whether or not there was, in the 1960's, a growing disrespect for law, Professor
Herbert Wechsler (a member of the National Crime Commission) stated:
This is entirely a personal opinion, but my recollection of the 1920's, when I went
to college was that my generation, the class of 1928 in college, hadn't the slightest
respect for law indeed. Indeed, we didn't even believe there was a legal system. As
a matter of fact, we were almost right about that. Meet the Press, Feb. 19, 1967,
at 9 (Merkle Press 1967).
33 MYERS AND NEWTON, supra note 32, at 389.
34 Act of March 4, 1929, ch. 706, 45 Stat. 1613. The Act appropriated the sum of
$250,000 to cover the fiscal years of 1929 and 1930 "[f]or the purposes of a thorough inquiry
into the problem of the enforcement of prohibition . . . together with the enforcement of
other laws." Id. The money was to be expended under the authority and by direction of
the President, who was to report results and recommendations to Congress.
35 Inaugural Address of President Hoover, March 4, 1929, 71 CONG. Rnc. 4-5 (1929).
As to the prospective appointment of a law enforcement commission, President Hoover spoke
in terms of a searching investigation of only the federal system, including the problems of
prohibition, and called for recommendations for reorganization of the administration of federal
laws and procedures.
36 MYERs AND NEWTON, supra note 32, at 389-90; Wickersham, The Program of the
Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, 16 A.B.A.J. 654 (1930).
37 Wickersham, supra note 36.
38 For example, one writer stated that no one could agree as to why the Commission
was appointed, but most of the given reasons were political. Murphy, The Sphinx Commission,
10 COMMONWEAL 249 (1929). See also, 156 OUTLOOK 85 (1930). But cf., Editorial, 15
A.B.A.J. 418 (1929), praising the President for visualizing "nothing less than a considera-
tion of the whole problem of law observance and law enforcement."
39 Address of the President of the United States in Opening the First Session of the
National Law Enforcement Commission, 71 CONG. REc. 3100 (1929).
40 Wickersham, supra note 36, at 654.
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the prohibition laws. The commission has been invited to make the widest
inquiry into the shortcomings of the administration of justice and into the
causes and remedies for them.4
Whatever the President's intentions might have been, Chairman Wickersham
never doubted the existence of a broad mandate.
Similarities in the background and work of the 1929 and 1965 commissions
are striking. As with the origin of the 1929 Commission, professional concern
about improving the framework and procedures of criminal justice produced im-
portant studies that preceded the appointment of the 1965 Commission. In the
1960's the American Law Institute had completed its Model Penal Code 2 and was
constructing a Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure." The American
Bar Association had launched a three-year project to develop minimum stan-
dards for criminal justice." The International Association of Chiefs of Police
was completing its Model Police Standards Council Act.4" A federally-funded,
three-year study of correctional manpower and training needs was just commenc-
ing.46 The American Bar Foundation was completing a then fourteen-year-old
project, Survey of the Administration of Criminal Justice in the United States,
for detailed factual observation and analysis of police, court, and correctional
procedures." In 1930, Mr. Wickersham commented:
Constant assertion has led to general acceptance of the statement that
there are radical defects in our laws and their administration, especially
in our criminal law and procedure. Within the last decade, Judicial Coun-
cils have been established in some nineteen (19) states; official Crime
Commissions in thirteen (13) and unofficial Crime Commissions in at least
two states and three cities; surveys of judicial establishments and the ad-
ministration of criminal justice have been made and published in not less
than five states and several cities. The American Law Institute . . . has
been . .. preparing a model code of criminal procedure. s
41 72 CONG. REc. 21, 27 (1929).
42 MODEL PENAL CODE (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
43 THE MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAiGNMENT PROCEDURE (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1966) was
in the drafting process when the National Commission commenced its work.
44 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR THE AD-
MINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE. The project's committees, staff, and reporters were
most cooperative with the National Crime Commission staff. Minimum Standard Project
publications include to date: FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS, POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES,
PLEAS OF GUILTY, APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCES, SPEEDY TRIAL, PROVIDING DE-
FENSE SERVICES, JOINDER AND SEVERANCE, SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES and
PRETRIAL RELEASE. All are tentative drafts, and all but the first (which was published in
1966) were published in 1967.
45 This project was completed in 1966 by the Advisory Council on Police Training and
Education and the Professional Standards Division of the International Association of Chiefs
of Police. The Model Police Standards Council Act represents proposed state legislation to
establish a regulatory council that would create and administer standards for recruitment
and training of local police. The act is reprinted in TFR ON THE POLICE 219-20.
46 The three-year Joint Commission on Correctional Manpower and Training was funded
pursuant to the Correctional Rehabilitation Study Act, 29 USC § 42 (Supp. II, 1965-66),
amending 29 U.S.C. § 42 (1964), and will make its report in 1968.
47 Raw material and drafts of chapters from the Survey Project were made available to
the National Crime Commission by the American Bar Foundation. Survey publications to
date include: LAFAVE, ARREST (1965); NEWMAN, CONVICTION (1966); and TIFFANY, MC-
INTYRE AND ROTENBERG, DETECTION OF CRIME (1967). Forthcoming publications will deal
with prosecution and sentencing.
48 Wickersham, supra note 36, at 656.
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Both commissions were also beset by an initial lack of real progress and by
funding problems. 9 Both utilized full-time staffs and drew upon renowned
scholars and practitioners as consultants and advisers. The broad areas of study
were substantially similar. However the Wickersham Commission completed
more comprehensive surveys of matters such as lawlessness in law enforcement
and court processing of cases. The National Crime Commission's surveys, on
the other hand, included a much broader range of subjects and reflected the
improvements in methodology.
The Wickersham Commission filed fourteen reports during 1930 and 1931:
two on prohibition; one each on prosecution, criminal procedure, the federal
courts (progress report only), lawlessness in law enforcement, police, criminal
statistics, cost of crime, penal institutions-probation-parole, causes of crime,
crime and the foreign born, enforcement of the deportation laws, and the child
offender in the federal system of justice."0 In most cases, each report contained
findings and the recommendations of the Commission itself, followed by findings
and conclusions of advisory committees and individual consultants. There was
no comprehensive general report such as that produced by the 1965 Commission.
As one might surmise from the titles, the 1929 Commission concentrated to a
much greater degree than the 1965 Commission on federal problems and pro-
cedures - prohibition enforcement and the eighteenth amendment, the federal
court system, and children processed in the federal system. In addition, a report
on crime and the foreign born was appropriate only because of the social con-
ditions of that earlier time.
49 Chairman Wickersham wrote:
Progress in our work at the outset was slow, because of the difficulty in securing
men and women to do the necessary work of research and inquiry. By the end of
the fiscal year 1930, we had some forty-five men and women, besides the regular
paid office force, more or less engaged in work for us, none of whom were receiving
compensation from the Commission!
In addition, we have had the assistance of a few regularly paid scholars. In some
cases we were indebted to colleges and universities for the services of members of
their regular staff. Wickersham, supra note 36, at 657.
Although the Wickersham Commission had received a $250,000 appropriation at the
beginning of its study in 1929, the unpopular prohibition report which it published in Janu-
ary of 1930 led to a move in Congress to withhold funds after June 1930. Id. at 654. The
President then made a public statement on June 27, 1930:
This deleted part of the appropriation is that devoted to investigation into the
cause and remedy for crime in general and for the determination of the reform
needed in our judicial and administrative machinery...
With growing crime of all kinds and with insistent recommendations from every
bar association and public body concerned that we should have an accurate study of
the reforms necessary . . . , that we should have some constructive program for
decrease and control of crime as a whole, I cannot abandon the question for one
moment or allow the work of this Commission to cease. I have asked the Com-
mission to proceed with its full program of work and it has consented to do so.
MYERS AsND NEWTON, supra note 32, at 444-45.
Six days later, Congress appropriated an additional $250,000 for the Commission for
use until June 30, 1931. Act of July 3, 1930, ch. 846, 46 Stat. 862. See also, Foreword,
Reports on Lazo Enforcement, 30 Micn. L. Rav. 1, n.3 '(1931); C. MARcY, supra note 4,
at 18-19.
50 Report No. 1 consists of a Preliminary Report on Observance and Enforcement of
Prohibition (Nov. 21, 1929) and an undated supplement thereto. H.R. Doc. No. 252, 71st
Cong., 2d Sess. 5-25 (1930). The study of the federal courts was completed by the American
Law Institute. ALI, A STUDY OF THE BUSINESS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS, PARTS I, II '(1934).
[Vol. 43:811]
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
In the areas where the two commissions overlapped the preceding one
created paths that the 1965 Commission either repeated, expanded, or carried
forward. In many areas the same theoretical and philosophical orientation pre-
vailed. The studies and analyses of economic and social factors as conditions of
crime are thus strikingly similar in the reports of both commissions." However,
President Hoover's Commission did not follow through with recommendations
on many of these matters as did the Johnson Commission. In other areas,
though, the two commissions did make similar recommendations, such as those
with respect to: the need for a national inventory of the costs of crime ;52 the
need for centralized criminal statistics;5" the need for centralized prosecution
systems at the state level;54 the need for improved communications, coordination
between departments, education, training, minority group representation, and
crime prevention in the police world; 5 the failure of prisons, the need to
strengthen probation and parole, and the assumption that community treatment
for offenders is the appropriate disposition unless proved otherwise in individual
cases;5" the emphasis upon improving the discretionary, invisible administrative
processing of offenders in the criminal justice system,5 and the recognition that
most offenders in the system are processed through without trial;" the shocking
conditions in the lower courts and the need for the same procedures and services
there that are found in the felony courts;5" the need for counsel for all defendants
facing more than the very lightest penalties;"0 the use of other procedures as
alternatives to custodial arrest; the appropriateness of indeterminate, as opposed
to mandatory minimum, sentences.6 "
In general, then, it can be stated fairly that both commissions emphasized
the same broad needs, i.e., crime prevention activities, development of alternative
ways to deal with offenders, elimination of unfairness and injustices, the need
for greatly improved personnel and other resources in the criminal justice system,
51 For example, the findings of Shaw and McKay in the 1929 Commission's Report on
the Causes of Crime (vol. II) received great emphasis in TFR on CRIME AND ITS IMPACT
- AN ASSESSMENT 60-76. Professor McKay also edited and wrote parts of a consultant
paper for the 1965 Commission: SUBSEQUENT ARRESTS, CONVICTIONS, AND COMMITMENTS
AMONG FORMER JUVENILE DELINQUENTS (McKay ed. 1967).
52 NATIONAL COMMISSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT [hereinafter Wicx-
ERSHAM COMM'N], REPORT ON THE COST OF CRIME 449-53 (1931). TFR on CRIME AND
ITS IMPACT-AN ASSESSMENT 42-59. In its recommendations, the 1931 report was
somewhat narrow in stressing primarily the need to determine the cost factors of the nation's
criminal justice machinery. The later commission placed additional emphasis upon ascertain-
ing with some degree of precision various other cost impacts of crime.
53 WICKERSHAM COMM'N, REPORT ON CRIMINAL STATISTICS 5-18; TFR on CRIME
AND ITS IMPACT-AN ASSESSMENT 123-37.
54 WICKERSHAM COMM'N, REPORT ON PROSECUTIONS 37-38; CRIME REPORT 147-49.
55 WICKERSHAM COMM'N, REPORT ON POLICE 1-10; CRIME REPORT 91-125.
56 WICKERSHAM COMM'N, REPORT ON PENAL INSTITUTIONS PROBATION AND PAROLE
170-74; CRIME REPORT 159-87.
57 WICKERSHAM COMM'N, REPORT ON PROSECUTION 6-29; TFR ON THE COURTS 4-13.
58 WICKERSHAM COMM'N, REPORT ON PROSECUTIONS 59-73, 186-221; CRIME REPORT
130-31.
59 WICKERSHAM COMM'N, REPORT ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 46; WICKERSHAM COMM'N,
REPORT ON PROSECUTIONS 45-221; CRIME REPORT 128-30.
60 WICKERSHAM COMM'N, REPORT ON PROSECUTIONS 27-33; CRIME REPORT 149-53.
61 WICKERSHAM COMM'N, REPORT ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 47; CRIME REPORT 132-33.
62 WICKERSHAM COMM'N, REPORT ON PENAL INSTITUTIONS PROBATION AND PAROLE
141-45; CRIME REPORT 142.
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and detailed requirements for research to fll massive gaps in the current state
of knowledge and information.
One can detect progress during the years between the two commissions.
For example, at the time of the Wickersham report, police training was a
virtually new phenomenon."8 The third degree was said to be commonplace.6 4
Probation and parole for adults lacked program content.6 5 Community treat-
ment alternatives that included elements of both regulation and community
activity for the offender had not commenced to any noticeable extent. Govern-
ment programs to aid those living in poverty areas were non-existent. Criminal
code reform had not commenced. The procedural revolution of the Supreme
Court as to police practices was yet to begin. Thus, a 1929 Commission member
looking at all these things today would detect improvement.
On the negative side, it is also clear that major recommendations of the
Wickersham Commission have never been implemented. The lack of individual-
ized justice by the police, prosecutor, judge, and correctional officer is probably
more of a problem today than it was in 1931. The lower courts looked the same
in 1965 as they did then."6 The decrepit prisons, condemned by the 1931 report,
in many instances were merely thirty-four years older in 1965.cY Jurisdictional
fractionalization of police departments, prosecutive offices, courts, and correc-
tions has persisted and created increasingly severe problems because of inter-
vening social change. Public attitudes still concentrate upon a perceived moral
decay, lack of respect for law, uncontrolled lawlessness, and criminal propensities
allegedly related to race. We have no national inventory of the costs of crime
and no national collection of statistics as to every stage of the criminal process.
Administrative processing of offenders by police and prosecutors still represents
an invisible anarchy suffering from lack of manpower, resources, information
about offenders, and policy guidance.
Of course, an exhaustive comparison of the two commissions, and of the
crime and criminal justice processes of their times, cannot be attempted here.
Nor may absolute comparisons be appropriate. For progress connotes not only
improvement in the way of doing things, but also an elevation of expectations
and ideals. A prisoner not physically abused by the police in the 1930's would
probably attribute improved fairness to the system then; today's concerns about
fairness center around counsel in the police station and politeness and lack of
compulsion during on-the-street questioning. But the Wickersham Commission
63 WICKERSHAM COMM'N, REPORT ON POLICE 4, 70-71.
64 WICKERSHAM COMM'N, REPORT ON LAWLESSNESS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 1-6.
65 WICKERSHAM COMM'N, REPORT ON PENAL INSTITUTIONS PROBATION AND PAROLE
135-36, 167-68. In U.S. BUREAU OF PRISONS, THmTY YEARS OF PRISON PROGRESS: 1930-
1960, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on National Penitentiaries of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 142, 144-45 (1964), the statement is made that when
the Federal Bureau of Prisons took jurisdiction over the U.S. Probation Service in 1930,
there were 4,280 probationers and eight probation officers.
66 See TFR ON THE COURTS 29-33, 120-38.
67 "Forty-three state penitentiaries or prisons, seven reformatories for men, and one
institution for women that were opened between 1805 and 1900 still stand and are still in
use in 36 states." MACCORMICK, ADULT CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES 7 (Consultant Paper 1967). The author points out that the design and construction
of these institutions make mass treatment almost inevitable. Id. at 62-63.
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did perceive many goals of their tomorrow and, for much of their guidance,
that tomorrow has not yet appeared.
IV. Operations of the National Crime Commission
As with any presidential commission, the membership of the National
Crime Commission was chosen by the President and his White House staff
with the aid of suggestions from many private and governmental sources. If
labels are desirable or have any validity, the membership reflected a somewhat
conservative orientation, with an average age of over fifty years. Those who
cry for public bodies to "tell it like it is" hardly anticipated a radical document
from a present and former U. S. Attorney General, the then president and two
former presidents of the American Bar Association, a former president of the
American College of Trial Lawyers, a police chief, a prosecutor, a state attorney
general, a former mayor of New York City, a former state secretary of internal
affairs, a newspaper publisher, and three judges."8 The four remaining members
were the president of the League of Women Voters of the United States, the
executive director of the National Urban League, the president of Yale Uni-
versity, and a distinguished law school professor who is co-reporter for the Model
Penal Code. President Johnson appointed Attorney General Katzenbach as
chairman of the Commission and James Vorenberg, a professor from Harvard
Law School and director of the Office of Criminal Justice, as the executive
director.
Aside from complicated and difficult administrative problems, the first task
facing the Commission was to build a staff and to outline the full scope of the
intended study. Although the Commission was created in July of 1965, ap-
propriations were not available until the following November, and a full staff
was not assembled until December. 9 By then, six of the eighteen months allotted
to the Commission had passed. During this time, however, task forces were
established to deal with the subjects of police, courts, corrections, and assessment
of the crime problem. Later, other working groups were established to deal with
juvenile delinquency, organized crime, narcotics and drug abuse, and drunk-
enness. Categorical subdivisions of study based upon less conventional lines
were devised but abandoned as unworkable in light of time and cost factors.
Early in 1966, the Institute for Defense Analyses was chosen to conduct broad
68 For biographical information about each Commission member, see CRIME REPORT
309-11. Attorney General Katzenbach became Undersecretary of State in September of 1966
but continued as chairman of the crime commission.
69 For a summary of Commission operations, see CRIME REPORT 311-12. The cost of
the Commission can be set at approximately two million dollars. About one million dollars
came from the joint appropriation for the national and District of Columbia commissions.
One and one-half million dollars was authorized for the two commissions. S.J. Rns. 102,
Pub. L. No. 89-196, 79 Stat. 827 (1965). The combined appropriation for the two com-
missions was $900,000 for fiscal year 1966. Act of Oct. 31, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-309, 79
Stat. 1151. And $550,000 was appropriated for fiscal year 1967. Act of Nov. 8, 1966, Pub.
L. No. 89-797, 80 Stat. 1502. The remaining one million dollars consisted primarily of
services and personnel loaned to the Commission by other agencies and research grants
awarded to others by the Office of Law Enforcement Assistance for projects of mutual benefit
to the Commission and to the Department of Justice. The greatest amounts of money were
expended in the areas of assessment of the crime problem, science and technology, and the
police; least money was expended upon drunkenness and organized crime.
[Symposium, 1968]
TO DUST SHALL YE RETURN?
inquiries into the possible contributions of science and technology to analysis of
crime and criminal justice and to changing and improving society's approach
to these problems. Each Commission member was assigned by the chairman to
work closely with one or two of the particular task forces. The Commission
then approved and added to work plans for each area of study at its first two
meetings in September of 1965 and January of 1966. The young staff (two-
thirds of whom were under thirty-eight years of age), with suggestions from
Commission members and other sources, recruited consultants and advisers
from every relevant discipline and agency to assist in the work. The staff itself
included lawyers, police officials, correctional personnel,; prosecutors, sociologists,
psychologists, systems analysts, juvenile delinquency prevention planners, and
professional writers and editors. Federal, state, and local agencies loaned person-
nel for appropriate part-time or full-time endeavors.
Much of the output of any study proceeds naturally from the fundamental
precepts that form its base. For many reasons, the Commission and its staff
primarily offered analysis and recommendations built upon existing foundations
of criminal law and its enforcement. Primary emphasis was not placed upon
studies of the appropriateness of the criminal sanction or of the traditional division
of responsibility among entities broadly categorized as police, prosecutor, court,
and corrections. Aside from the recommendation to remove drunkenness per
se as a crime, the subject of overcriminalization produced only a general recom-
mendation that states should reconsider their criminal laws pertaining to personal
status and social morality."'
Other issues, critical in the eyes of many, also failed to receive primary
attention: capital punishment, civilian review boards, a perceived decline in
religion and traditional morality, the effect of court decisions upon crime and
law enforcement, violence and the mass media, crime and pornography, the
anatomy of riots, and electronic surveillance. Although all these subjects did
receive attention, they did not receive primary attention and study. Some rose to
the level of recommendations wherein the generality of context makes evident the
underlying emotionalism and compromise. Others were dismissed as having no
basis in fact or as simplified, emotional cloud-cover for complex questions. Lack
of time and data also precluded productive analysis of some of these problems.
I do not think it appropriate for me, as a former staff participant in the
Commission, to defend or condemn the approach taken. There are compelling
reasons for and against the decisions not to carry many of these issues to definitive
conclusions in a broad commission study. It should be recognized, however,
that these decisions were not made by default or through lack of recognition.
70 The recommendation to remove drunkenness in itself as a criminal offense is found
in CRIz REPORT 236. The recommendations on dangerous drugs and marijuana stated
only the need for research upon which a framework of regulatory law could be based. Id. at
216, 225. There was no recommendation as to the substantive crimes connected with narcotics.
But see the separate statement of four Commissioners. Id. at 302-03. As to gambling, abor-
tion, vagrancy, disorderly conduct, and minor sexual offenses, the Commission said only that
when states institute the recommended general criminal code reform, the kinds of behavior
to be defined as criminal should be weighed carefully. Id. at 126-27. The whole problem
of substantive law reform was considered in TFR ON THE COURTS 97-107. See also, J.
SKOLNICK, COERCION TO VIRTUE: A SOCIOLOGICAL DIscussIoN OF THE ENFORCEMENT OF
MoRALs (Consultant Paper 1967); TFR ON ORGANIZED CRIME 114-26. A study of gambling
and possible ramifications of its legalization was commenced but could not be completed in time.
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Proper attention and heat were present in the decision-making process. Others
must judge whether the gaps remaining after the Commission concluded its
work doomed its study to failure or formed a prerequisite to the probability of
positive achievement. Those who looked to the Commission for detailed pro-
nouncements about the enforcement of individual and public morality through
criminalization were profoundly disappointed."1 Those, too, who sought con-
firmation of moral indignation at the state of lawlessness or desired immediate
solutions or yearned for the reassertion of a punishment philosophy or expected
identification of single-track, remediable causes of crime, must have written off
the Commission's work as avoiding the real issues at hand. 2
71 See, e.g., Packer, Copping Out, New York Review of Books, Oct. 12, 1967, at 17;
Silver, Crime-American Style: The President's Commission, 86 COMMONWEAL 141 (1967);
McCord, We Ask the Wrong Questions About Crime, N.Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1965, (Magazine)
at 27. Professor Kadish prepared the substantive criminal law chapter in the Task Force
Report on the Courts. TFR on THE CouRTs 97-107. He subsequently stated:
I could hardly come now either to praise it or to bury it. Still, it may be said
that the controversial character of these issues, and the need to achieve consensus
among nineteen Commissioners of highly differing backgrounds and orientation,
quite understandably required some reduction in scope and muting in tone and
conclusion of my original draft. I note this not in complaint. Indeed, that these
distinguished citizens, who, as a group, can scarcely be charged with being im-
moderate or visionary, were prepared to raise substantial reservations concerning
the overextension of the criminal law is itself an event of significance. Kadish, The
Crisis of Overcriminalization, 374 ANNALS 157 (1967).
As to legalized gambling, my own view is that if a Commission device were to be used,
a study devoted exclusively to that subject is necessary. Current writing and suggestions by
scholars, practitioners, and public officials are extremely narrow, simplistic, naive, and un-
sophisticated.
72 Columnist James J. Kilpatrick wrote:
What matters to the average citizen is not so much the abstract of statistical prob-
lems, or even the sociologists' long-range solution. His concern goes to the mugger,
the rapist, the dope-crazed thief, the arrogant young punks who infest his streets.
What can be done about them now? One of the commission's answers is to pro-
vide textbooks for slum schools that are written in slum English. Okay, okay. But
what can be done tomorrow, next week, next month, to lock up the hoods and thieves?
The Washington Evening Star, Feb. 21, 1967, at 23, col. 4. An Anderson, South Carolina,
newspaper wrote in an editorial:
Those who were under the impression that the National Crime Commission was
established to afford direction and support to immediate practical steps to curb
crime must now be having second thoughts.
Can you imagine even a nervous shoplifter, much less hardened killer-rapists,
cringing under the threat of a set of "meaningful statistics"?
Hardly!
Anderson Independent, March 11, 1966. The editorial was entitled: "If You Hoped for a
Real Attack on Crime, Just Forget About It."
The lack of recommendations for immediate reduction in street crime probably caused
the greatest public disappointment in the Commission's work. Although implementation of
many recommendations of the Commission could have been commenced without cost the
day after the report appeared, none of them would have caused immediate crime reduction.
As to the long-range nature of the report, an urban affairs expert commented:
The lay reader might respond, "yes, of course, but what do we do tomorrow
morning that will reduce the chance of my wife having her purse snatched by some
punk on the way to the supermarket?"
Not much, it appears. Wilson, A Reader's Guide to the Crime Commission
Reports, Ta PUBLIC INTEREST, Fall, 1967, at 65.
Reaction to the report, of course, depended a great deal upon the preconceptions, atti-
tudes, and knowledge that the particular reader possessed before examining the documents.
For example, Wilson stated that the great majority of the over two hundred recommendations
seemed rather obvious and not very illuminating. Id. On the other hand, Congressman
Rarick (D., La.) termed the National Crime Commission "the new anti-law-and-order front
. . . against just about everything American. . . . Without any experience or testing of their
revolutionary theories, they would destroy overnight 190 years of proven record." 113 CONG.
Rzc. A2532 (daily ed. May 23, 1967).
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What the Commission primarily concentrated upon was the measure of
crime in our society today, the current responses thereto, and the formulation
of directions for change. The reports had to be geared to serve divergent in-
terests and levels of knowledge. Public education considerations required docu-
ments attractive to, and comprehensible by, the layman. Reform considerations
required a presentation that would be persuasive to public officials and prac-
titioners alike. The requirements of research in the future dictated goals of
servicing the academic community and creating a useful educational tool for
students. Integrity required that matters be presented as perceived despite what
practical or political considerations might otherwise imply. An impossible task
indeed, but one that required each person to concentrate upon this impossible
possibility. No one could honestly claim in the end that compromises were not
made.
Urban crime received the most intensive treatment. But the most difficult,
as well as the most unmanageable, part of the study was crime prevention.
As the general report states:
Warring on poverty, inadequate housing and unemployment, is warring
on crime. A civil rights law is a law against crime. Money for schools is
money against crime. Medical, psychiatric, and family-counselling services
are services against crime. More broadly and most importantly every
effort to improve life in America's "inner cities" is an effort against crime.73
The Commission's study thus became concerned with practically every social
program and every social service provided by the various branches of govern-
ment. The most vexing problem centered around the degree of specificity that
was necessary and practical in formulating findings and recommendations con-
cerning schools, jobs, welfare, and community and family services. Consultants
were requested to study the relationship between each of these problems and
crime: crime and the inner city, crime and employment, crime and the family,
and crime and the school. Examples of promising social programs were re-
quested. The scarcity of ideas for direct deterrent and apprehension methods
in controlling crime in the streets led to the science and technology study. This
later broadened to include the entire criminal julstice system. Emphasis was also
placed upon gathering information that would demonstrate the diversity, com-
plexity, and universality of crime in our society.
Extensive field studies were conducted in each area. Only a few can be
mentioned here. In assessing the crime problem, the first national survey of
unreported crime 4 and a detailed three-city survey of law enforcement practices 5
were completed. In the police task force, a survey of promising new procedures
in 2,200 police departments was initiated." A nationwide survey77 and an
73 CRImE REPORT 6.
74 NATIONAL OPINION RESEARCH CENTER, FIELD SURVEY II, CRiMINAL VIcTrmzAToN
IN THE UNITED STATES (1967).
75 UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN SURVEY RESEARCH CENTER, FIELD SURVEY III, STUDIES
IN CRIME AND LAW ENFORCEMENT IN THE MAJOR METROPOLITAN AREAS (1967).
76 POLICE PROCEDURES ADVISORY GROUP, REPORT ON POLICE FIELD PROCEDURES (Con-
sultant Paper 1967). Responses from the various police departments offered astoundingly
few ideas or programs geared to increased apprehension or deterrence.
77 NATIONAL CENTER ON POLICE AND COMMUNITY RELATIONS, FIELD SURVEY V: A
[Vol 43:811)
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
intensive two-city study78 of police-community relations were completed. A
national survey of corrections was conducted by the National Council on Crime
and Delinquency. 9 Detailed observations of selected lower courts in various
areas of the country were conducted."0 A national juvenile court survey was
conducted by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare in conjunction
with the Commission.8 Information was collected from various agencies on
organized crime, court processing of offenders, delinquency prevention programs,
enforcement of drunkenness laws, and enforcement and other programs in the
narcotics field. Federal departments made available extensive data. The science
and technology study included the collection and analysis of data on the police
apprehension process, the administration of court systems, police communications,
command, and control, programed learning in corrections, and various criminal
justice information systems.82 The four hundred individual consultants and
advisers produced facts as well as ideas.
The reports of the Commission reflect this literal mountain of data. But
even so, in many areas the members and staff had to rely on initial samplings
or traditional measuring devices as bases for conclusions. This naturally had
a bearing on the accuracy of these conclusions. For example, there is much
more crime than is reported to the police, but how accurate is a public sampling
device for this purpose? 3 If there are twenty instances of excessive use of force
by police in 5,339 police-citizen encounters observed in three cities, what nation-
wide projections can be made as to the extent of such brutality? If an experi-
mental community program in California for youth offenders reduced the rate
of recidivism further than that of a prison control group, what general conclu-
sions are justifiable in formulating a corrections philosophy? Is there any cor-
relation between the number of convictions of organized crime figures and
society's degree of control over the influence of organized crime? If police re-
sponse time to calls in one city separates out as the crucial factor in eventual
solution of crime there, does this afford a basis for prime emphasis in recom-
mended improvements in police procedures? Again, these are merely examples
of the data problems. The collection of data as to each facet of crime and
criminal justice was burdened by a fundamental lack of information, research,
and statistics.
Also to be met were the untested assumptions: A college-educated police-
man is better than an uneducated one. Police corruption has decreased con-
NATIONAL SURVEY OF POLICE AND COMMUNITY RELATIONS (1967).
78 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT BERKELEY, SCHOOL OF CRIMINOLOGY, FIELD SURVEY
IV, THE POLICE AND THE COMMUNITY (1967).
79 National Council on Crime and Delinquency, Correction in the United States, TFR
ON CORRECTIONS 115.
80 See, e.g., TFR ON THE COURTS 120.
81 TFR ON JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 77.
82 These studies are printed as appendices in TFR ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 83.
83 See Biderman and Reiss, On Exploring the "Dark Figure" of Crime, 374 ANNALS 1
(1967); Biderman, Surveys of Population Samples for Estimating Crime Incidence, 374
ANNALS 16 (1967). Dr. Biderman supervised a project for the District of Columbia and
National Crime Commissions wherein the Bureau of Social Science Research surveyed un-
reported crime and public attitudes as to crime and law enforcement in the District of Colum-
bia. BUREAU OF SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH, FIELD STUDY I: REPORT ON A PILOT STUDY IN
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ON VICTIMIZATION AND ATTITUDES TowARD LAW ENFORCE-
MENT (1967).
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siderably, and corruption is not a major problem in court and correctional
systems. The degree of criminal activity in a society varies inversely with the
strength of the threat of apprehension. More jobs and better schools will de-
crease crime rather than create new forms of criminality. The FBI crime index
measures the most serious crimes rather than the ones about which information
is most readily available.
Some of these assumptions were altered by the Commission; others were
preserved pending further research and study. Lack of knowledge created a
further gap in the Commission's work. For example, there is no accurate ac-
count of the amount and costs of criminality among the various classes of people
who wield political, economic, and moral power in America.
The work of the staff proceeded simultaneously, by necessity, on both the
general report and the individual task force reports. Consultant papers were
completed at various times and integrated into the staff work. Several leading
scholars worked full-time as part of the staff during the summer of 1966. With
a few notable exceptions, the writing of the reports was accomplished by the
staff utilizing the assembled data and many ideas from the consultant papers.
Drafts were submitted to Commission members prior to their meetings. They
met a total of seven times, two or three days per session. Changes and ideas
offered by Commission members at full sessions, in individual communication,
and in task force meetings were incorporated into the reports. The members
probably received over two and one-half million words of material.
Naturally, most of the work was performed by staff and consultants; theirs
was the job of educating and persuading Commission members as well as each
other. But in the end, the general report was that of the members themselves.
In it, they are saying as a body to the President and to the American people:
this is the way we feel about the crime problem and this is what we think our
nation ought to do about it. A consensus among nineteen prominent persons
to whom all kinds of approaches have been presented balances the general and
the specific, the radical and the conservative, the ideal and the practical, the long-
term and the short-term considerations. The National Crime Commission clearly
made this choice of consensus. An already polarized society would not receive
a polarized report. The separate statements by Commission members on religion,
police and court procedures, and narcotics bespeak little conflict with most of
the broad sweep of the reports.8"
Again, evaluation must be left to others. I do believe firmly, however, that
if the American public and its government officials achieved the same level of
knowledge and attitudinal response created in the Commission and its staff by
84 CanmE REPORT 302-08. Short of writing a book filled with specific examples, it
is difficult to convey the bustling flavor that precedes the development of a consensus-
the frustrations, the in-fighting, the evolution of a reconciliation of polarized views among
both staff and commission members, the educational process that induces genuine changes
in perception and beliefs. The only expressed major disagreement in the body of the report
pertained to wiretapping and electronic surveillance. Although the Commission agreed upon
a recommendation that federal law in this area should be clarified and that use of such
devices should be outlawed, only a majority of the members agreed that an exception should
be made for law enforcement officers' use of such surveillance under stringent, carefully-
prescribed limitations. Id. at 203. It became clear during the course of the Commission's
work that the Johnson Administration earnestly disagreed with the majority position.
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two years of study, the nation would be launching significant, progressive steps
on a wide basis in every field of crime prevention and criminal justice. If the
reports can be said to reflect the bases for this belief, the goals that the Com-
mission set for itself will have been accomplished. Criticism should be focused
upon the validity of these goals in light of all the given factors surrounding the
Commission and its work. It should be noted that criticism of this type would
be particularly valuable to the establishment and work of future commissions
studying any subject.
V. Implementation of the Commission's Proposals
Other sections of this symposium will explore individual proposals and
directions set by the Commission. The theme of the general report is stated
therein:
The Commission finds, first, that America must translate its well-
founded alarm about crime into social action that will prevent crime. It
has no doubt whatever that the most significant action that can be taken
against crime is action designed to eliminate slums and ghettos, to improve
education, to provide jobs, to make sure that every American is given the
opportunities and the freedoms that will enable him to assume his respon-
sibilities.... To speak of controlling crime only in terms of the work of
the police, the courts and the correctional apparatus, is to refuse to face
the fact that widespread crime implies a widespread failure by society as
a whole.
The Commission finds, second, that America must translate its alarm
about crime into action that will give the criminal justice system the where-
withal to do the job it is charged with doing. Every part of the system
is undernourished. There is too little manpower and what there is is not
well enough trained or well enough paid. Facilities and equipment are
inadequate. Research programs that could lead to greater knowledge about
crime and justice, and therefore to more effective operations, are almost
non-existent. To lament the increase in crime and at the same time to
starve the agencies of law enforcement and justice is to whistle in the wind.
The Commission finds, third, that the officials of the criminal justice sys-
tem itself must stop operating, as all too many do, by tradition or by rote.
They must re-examine what they do. They must be honest about the
system's shortcomings with the public and with themselves. They must
be willing to take risks in order to make advances. They must be bold.
Those three things are what this report is about s5
Inherent in these directions is a belief that the degree of crime in a society
may not bear close relation to the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the criminal
justice system. The core concepts of crime prevention and reintegration of the
offender into an acceptable social framework depend upon social and individual
factors to which the criminal justice system merely contributes rather than
85 CRIME RnPORT 15.
[Symposium, 1968]
TO DUST SHALL YE RETURN?
controls. Prevailing social conditions and society's failures to acknowledge and
meet them form the most significant starting point in crime control. Thus, the
Commission made clear their belief that crime would continue to rise during
the next decade no matter what changes or reforms were instituted by police,
courts, and correctional officials. There were no immediate solutions compatible
with the competing values of our society.
Two basic themes pervaded a great majority of the Commission's recom-
mendations as to the criminal justice system. First is the philosophy that the
criminal label and the complete, formal criminal process should be reserved for
offenders involved in the most serious crimes or in repeated criminal conduct. This
orientation guided specific recommendations for the exercise of police discretion,
diversion of arrested persons by the prosecutor out of the court system, develop-
ment of alternative tracks for such persons to services in the community, diversion
of juveniles at the intake stage away from the adjudicatory process, full use of com-
munity services at the disposition and correction stages. Such an approach led to
specific needs in the agencies themselves: new career patterns and a greater variety
of skills in police departments, improved information gathering and processing by
the prosecutor and the court, and flexibility and community treatment in the
corrections field. A more discriminating use of the full panoply of the criminal
justice system would permit more effective processing of those offenders whose
criminal conduct interferes most severely with public order and individual
security.
The second basic theme revolves around the need to inject into the criminal
justice system positive programs for juveniles, misdemeanants, and for offenders
who have had the original charge against them reduced from a felony to a mis-
demeanor. Prosecutors, judges, and correction officers have been devoting most
of their time, concern, resources, and procedural fairness to offenders processed
in the felony courts; yet these are the offenders who probably have already
developed criminal careers and for whom diversion away from future criminal
activities is least hopeful. Increased emphasis upon the minor and first offenders
led to many of the above recommendations and to others: the need for defense
counsel, pre-sentence reports, and individualized discretion by the prosecutor
in the lower courts; informed and consistent sentencing practices; massive in-
fusion of resources into juvenile aftercare; the introduction of procedural fairness
into the juvenile court process; the need for probation and parole supervision,
with available community services and youth service bureaus, for those processed
by the juvenile and lower courts; reorganization of court, prosecutive, and cor-
rectional structures; the need to remove drunkenness offenders from the criminal
process. The Commission called for a development of individual justice, pro-
cessing, and treatment in every agency to replace the mass justice of this and
preceding eras. Throughout the reports one can detect a sense of futility in
improvement of the police apprehension process without a concomitant, or per-
haps preceding, reform in the court and correctional process.
The general report was released by the President in February of 1967 and
the nine task force reports were released seriatim during April-June of that year.
The consultant papers were published at the end of June.
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VI. Implementation of Recommendations
Implementation had been a concern of the Commission and the staff from
the very beginning. The initial thrust in this area was devoted to one of the
principal purposes of the Commission, public education. A former magazine and
TV news writer was hired for public information purposes and was named an
assistant director of the staff. Members and staff spoke throughout the country
about crime and the Commission's study. Numerous articles appeared in the
mass media. An unprecedented ninety-minute presentation of the network tele-
vision show, "Meet the Press," featured five Commission members and the
executive director of the staff immediately after the release of the general report."8
Newspaper, television, and magazine coverage of the Commission's reports was
quite extensive from February through June of 1967.7
Of course, this was merely an ephemeral phase of the implementation task.
Through the course of the Commission's work, many conferences were held in
cooperation with other agencies and organizations not only to gather ideas but
also to lay the groundwork for acceptance of the recommendations. A symposium
on science and criminal justice was sponsored to acquaint industry with law
enforcement needs.8 A conference on legal manpower needs explored the im-
plications for the Bar in extending the right to counsel to virtually every legal
proceeding involving possible loss of freedom. 9 In March of 1966, the Attorney
General invited each governor to establish a state criminal justice committee to
cooperate with the National Commission and to implement Commission recom-
mendations through statewide programs when the National Commission had
completed its work. A resolution of the National Governors' Conference urged
each governor to create such a committee.9" In October of 1966, the President's
Commission sponsored a conference for governors' representatives from each
state; the work of the Commission and the directions thereof were discussed. A
massive federal aid program for criminal justice reform was formulated by the
Commission and its staff and became the basis for President Johnson's proposed
Crime Control Act.' The involvement of so many practitioners in the Commis-
sion's study created a base of experts who understood and for the most part
advocated the Commission's recommendations. In March of 1967, a two-day
conference of seven hundred representatives from federal, state, local, and private
86 NATIONAL BROADCASTING COMPANY, MEET THE PRESS (1967).
87 Of the hundreds of editorials appearing in newspapers throughout the nation, the
consensus as to the general report was favorable. Most newspapers and magazines termed
the report a call for a needed massive infusion of resources.
88 See PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON SCIENCE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE
(1966). The symposium was sponsored by the National Crime Commission, the President's
Office of Science and Technology, and the Office of Law Enforcement Assistance, U.S. Dept.
of Justice. The Illinois Institute of Technology plans to hold annual symposiums on the
subject of law enforcement, science, and technology. The first was held in March of 1967.
Papers presented thereto are reprinted in LAW ENFORCEMENT, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
(A. Yefsky ed. 1967).
89 See Report of the Conference on Legal Manpower Needs of Criminal Law, 41 F.R.D.
389 (1967). The conference was sponsored by the National Crime Commission, the American
Bar Association Project on Minimum Standards for the Administration of Criminal Justice,
and the National Defender Project of the National Legal Aid and Defender Association.
90 39 STATE Gov. 204 (1966).
91 See S. 917 and H.R. 5037, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
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agencies, organizations, and institutions served in part to explain and discuss the
Commission's findings and recommendations. 2
At the conclusion of the two-year study, approximately one hundred thou-
sand of the various reports were distributed at government expense, including
forty thousand copies of the general report.9 3 They were sent to persons in the
criminal justice field; to scholars and educators; to mayors, city managers, and
legislators at all levels; to governors, businessmen, and other community leaders.
Copies of the reports are sold by the Government Printing Office at modest ex-
pense, and by December of 1967, over one hundred eighty thousand of the
various reports had been purchased by individuals, organizations, and agencies.
The general report was the subject of about one-third of these purchases. Each
of the reports has been reprinted several times, and the demand continues.94
What of the future? Does all this motion lead to progress? Attorney General
Ramsey Clark stated recently:
Now we are engaged in a great renaissance in crime control. President
Johnson's Crime Commission has just completed the most comprehensive
study of crime, its cause and cures, ever undertaken. This is the easy part.
Implementation, as always, is the major task.
It is an appropriate time to recall an earlier study of crime only a
generation ago; a time of comparative simplicity.
In 1931 the Wickersham Commission . .. concluded, in these words,
"that the present prison system is antiquated and inefficient. It does not re-
form the criminal. It fails to protect society." The Commission added that if
the system as then comprised were unable to rehabilitate, then it should be
"so reshaped as to insure a larger measure of success." America failed to
accept the challenge and 36 years later ... (i)t is not surprising that the
challenge unheeded in 1931 is resurrected in 1967. Our reaction to the
challenge will be crucial to the control of crime in America, to the quality
of our lives and those of our children.95
The implementation failures following the Wickersham Commission are
evident. The reasons therefore are manifold. Certainly two of the principal
problems were its publication at the heart of the Great Depression and its loss
of credibility and respectability in public and legislative eyes by reason of ambiv-
alent and unpopular recommendations on the issue of prohibition." A com-
92 See PROCEEDINGS, FIRST NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CRIME CONTROL (1967).
93 This was part of the dissemination program of the Office of Law Enforcement Assis-
tance, U.S. Dept. of Justice.
94 Letter from Rowland E. Darling, Deputy Supt. of Doc., U.S. Gov. Printing Office,
to Henry S. Ruth, Jr., December 29, 1967. Of the nine task force reports, those relating
to the police, organized crime, and the courts have been requested in greatest volume. The
three volumes account for approximately fifty thousand of the one hundred ten thousand
task force reports sold. Id.
95 Report of the 97th Annual Congress of Correction, 29 AM. J. oF CORR. 13, 17-18
(1967).
96 The judiciary and the Bar probably took greatest note of the Wickersham Commis-
sion's work. And, undoubtedly, reforms in police interrogation practices and criminal pro-
cedure did receive impetus from the Commission's reports. However, the public, legislators,
and other public officials apparently disregarded the findings and recommendations for the
most part. The following are merely illustrations of the reaction:
The public and the press, in their disappointment at the Commission's failure to
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mission can serve only as a catalyst to national reform. Many other factors in
society dominate the extent of that catalytic influence. It is doubtful if anyone
can truly assess the effect of a commission's work in such a broad field as crime
and crime control. No matter what the state of readiness for reform in the
practitioners' world of criminal justice, they can move forward only if public
opinion and elected officials permit them to do so.
There are discouraging factors: riots in over one hundred cities in the sum-
mer of 1967, an apparent hardening in police and public attitudes, the failure
in the recent session of Congress to pass the President's crime control bill,"7 a
presidential campaign in 1968 that promises to feature the simplistic "lawlessness"
cries of 1928 and 1964."s
identity itself squarely with one side or the other of the prohibition controversy,
have manifested a disposition to brush aside its work with a wave of the hand and
a few disparaging remarks. Foreword, Reports of the National Commission on Law
Observance and Enforcement, 30 M3cr. L. Rmv. 1, 3 (1931).
"The Commission became a subject of contumely and contempt." Strout, Mr. Wicker-
sham's Platform, 234 No. AM. RaV. 196 (1932).
"In Congress, the report (as to prohibition) was received with a mixture of adverse
criticism and ridicule." Wolf, The United States, 33 CUR. HisT. 911 (1931).
In McNamus, Unhappy Warrior: A Portrait of George W. Wickersham, 156 OuTLooK
85, 116 (1930), the author stated that among Washington, D.C. correspondents there was
a unanimous indifference to the Commission's work.
As to the prohibition report, an editorial in 133 CATH. WORLD 99 (1931) stated:
"Seriously and solemnly they reported that conditions are very bad and recommended that
nothing be done about it."
In the middle of the Commission's study, one periodical advised that the best possible
course for the Commission members was to go home quietly and quickly. 155 OuTLoox
374 (1930).
In 1934, the Attorney General of the United States called a conference of six hundred
representatives of states, cities, and professional organizations to discuss all problems of crime
and criminal justice and particularly to discuss the Department of Justice's role in helping
state and local law enforcement. H. CUMMINGS AND C. McF.ALAND, FEDERAL JUSTICE
476-85 (1937). At the conference, the Attorney General and President Roosevelt made no
mention of the Wickersham Commission in their addresses to conference delegates. PROCEED-
INGS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S CONFERENCE ON CRIME 3-8, 17-20, 456-61 (1935). The
then president of the American Bar Association stated at the conference:
Consider the Wickersham Commission, which made one of the most thorough
investigations of law observance and enforcement of our time. The thirteen (sic)
volumes of that report are now gathering dust on the shelves of college libraries,
and copies of most of them are no longer available. Id. at 198, 199-200.
The work of the Commission received very little mention during the course of the 1934
conference.
A full appraisal and description of the implementation of the Wickersham Commission
reports will be published in the Spring of 1968 by the Institute of Criminal Law and Pro-
cedure of the Georgetown University Law Center. Unfortunately, that material is not avail-
able at the time of the writing of this article.
97 A version of this bill may have been passed in the second session of the Ninetieth
Congress by the time this article appears. See S. 917 and H.R. 5037, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1967).
98 Richard Nixon wrote recently:
Far from being a great society, ours is becoming a lawless society. First,
there is the permissiveness toward violation of the law and public order by
those who agree with the cause in question. Second, there is the indulgence of
crime because of sympathy for the past grievances of those who have become
criminals......
Our opinion-makers have gone too far in promoting the doctrine that when a law
is broken, society, not the criminal, is to blame. Our teachers, preachers and
politicians have gone too far in advocating the idea that each individual should
determine what laws are good and what laws are bad, and that he then should
obey the law he likes and disobey the law he dislikes.
Nixon, What Has Happened to America?, Reader's Digest, Oct. 1967, at 49. A recent New
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On the other -hand, there are encouraging factors as well. Many professional
organizations have utilized the Commission's reports as an added impetus for
recommended change. Governors' crime committees have adopted Commission
recommendations for action within several states. Many police departments have
implemented some key proposals of the Commission. Federal agencies, such as
the Department of Housing and Urban Development and the Office of Economic
Opportunity, have awarded grants to urban communities for experimental pro-
grams that adopt particular recommendations of the Commission.
Directions for the future hang in the balance. Other commissions have
already commenced or are completing their work: The National Advisory Com-
mission on Civil Disorders, The National Commission on Reform of Federal
Criminal Laws, and a presidential commission on obscenity, pornography, and
crime.9 But anyone who appreciates the use of power by various branches of
government realizes all too well that a commission is not a power device. The
course of crime control lies with each public official's choice between expediency
and responsibility in this time of great national crisis. Upon these factors also
depend the epitaph that historians will place upon the National Crime Com-
mission's reports.
York Times Editorial commenced this way
One of the biggest applause-getters in this fading year has been the get-tough
speech against crime in the streets. Public officials and prospective candidates on
all levels have found it especially successful in areas where civil rights demonstrations
have taken violent turns....
The contagion of crack-down tactics is spreading. N.Y. Times, Dec. 31, 1967
at 10E, col. 1.
99 The report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders should have
been published by the time this article appears. The National Commission on Reform of
Federal Criminal Laws will submit its final report in November 1969. The obscenity com-
mission report is due in January 1970.
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